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investigate possible impairment of state substantive rights. 9 Davis is
the first case in which the Fourth Circuit has relied on Hanna to decide a
diversity choice of law question."
Although the Fourth Circuit in Davis correctly employed the Hanna
precedent, the court failed to complete the Rules Enabling Act sub-
stance versus procedure analysis.6' Under the Rules Enabling Act,
courts should be especially sensitive to whether the federal rule affects
a state substantive interest.62 In future cases where a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure and a state law conflict, the Fourth Circuit should test
the validity and pertinence of the rule under the complete Hanna
analysis to determine whether the federal rule should apply. 3 Never-
theless, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Davis clarifies the Erie doctrine
by emphasizing the narrow applicability of Hanna to cases involving only
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
LIZANNE THOMAS
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Constitutionality of Political Patronage Transfers
The tradition of appointing persons to government offices because of
their loyalty to an elected official is rooted deeply in American political
50 Id Professor McCoid notes that even Hanna did not properly emphasize the neces-
sity of a substance analysis under the Rules Enabling Act. McCoid, supra note 3, at 887.
' The Fourth Circuit has addressed the diversity choice of law question several times
since the Supreme Court's holding in Hanna. See generally Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435
F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971); Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons
Co., 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969); Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969); Bowman v.
Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60
(4th Cir. 1965). Nevertheless, the court had never before relied exclusively on Hanna.
The Fourth Circuit normally cites Hanna to support the independence, integrity, and
uniformity of the federal court system. See Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 535
n.40 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971) (tolling effect of pendency of identical
suit in another federal court determined by federal law to ensure unitary nature of federal
court system); Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 405 F.2d 1061, 1064 (4th Cir. 1969)
(federal standard applied to seventh amendment question to promote independence of
federal court system); Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 711 (4th Cir. 1966) (Erie's
goal of uniformity requires federal courts to follow state jurisdictional ddcision).
In Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969), the Fourth Circuit validated Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) by emphasizing the policy of federal uniformity without ad-
dressing Hanna's substance versus procedure distinction. Id. at 127. See also Szantay v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1965).
'l See text accompanying notes 44-50 supra.
See text accompanying note 23 supra.
See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
See note 6 supra.
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history. While an elected official's right to employ loyal political
followers has never been questioned, recent Supreme Court decisions
hold that under some circumstances, an elected official may not dismiss a
government employee when the sole ground for dismissal is the
employee's failure to affiliate with the elected official's political party.2
In DeLong v. United States,' the Fourth Circuit considered the issue of
whether an elected official may transfer an employee to a position with
equal pay but reduced responsibilities solely because of the employee's
political affiliation."
Malcolm M. DeLong was the State Director of the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA) for Maine.' When President Carter took office in
1977, the Secretary of Agriculture requested DeLong's resignation.' The
Secretary desired to replace DeLong, a Republication patronage ap-
pointee, with a Democrat.7 DeLong refused to resign.' The Secretary of
I See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353-55 (1976); M. TOLCHIN & A. TOLCHIN, To THE
VICToR, 5-6, 323-326 (1971) (development of political patronage in United States).
' Branti v. Finkel, 100 S. Ct. 1287, 1295 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
3 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 622. In addition to considering the circumstances under which political
patronage employees may be transferred, the DeLong court addressed the issue of whether
DeLong's transfer violated the Veteran's Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1976). 621 F.2d at
624-25. The Veteran's Preference Act allows an "adverse action" against "preference eligi-
ble employees" only when the "adverse action" will promote service efficiency. 5 U.S.C. §
7512(a) (1976). The Act defines "preference eligible employees" as employees who received
honorable discharges from the United States armed forces after serving wartime duty. Id.
§§ 2108, 7511-12. An "adverse action" under the Act includes dismissal, suspension without
pay for more than thirty days, and reduction in rank or pay. Id. § 7511(2).
DeLong, who qualified as a "preference eligible employee," claimed that his transfer
violated his rights under the Veteran's Preference Act because the transfer amounted to a
rank reduction. 621 F.2d at 624. The Federal Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA) review-
ed DeLong's claim and held that DeLong's transfer to a position carrying reduced respon-
sibility did not constitute a rank reduction under the Veteran's Preference Act because the
transfer did not reduce DeLong's official rank. Id. DeLong appealed the FEAA decision to
federal district court. DeLong v. United States, No. 78-924-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 1978)
(mem.), reprinted in, DeLong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980) app. at 312
[hereinafter cited as Appendix]. The district court affirmed the FEAA decision. Id. at 323.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, DeLong claimed that the district court erred by fail-
ing to conduct a hearing to determine the duties of DeLong's new position. 621 F.2d at 625.
DeLong asserted that due process required such a hearing because proving that his transfer
amounted to a rank reduction under the Veteran's Preference Act required proof that his
new position's actual duties differed from the duties detailed in the position's official job
description. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the Veteran's Preference Act did not require
such a hearing. Id. The court noted that the Federal Personnel Manual determines a federal
employee's job rank by reference to the employee's official job description, and that actual
duties are irrelevant in assessing alleged federal employee rank reductions. Id. at 625 n.6.
The Fourth Circuit held that DeLong did not have a right to a hearing to compare DeLong's
actual duties with the duties described in the official job description. Id. at 625.
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Agriculture then transferred DeLong to the position of Program Assis-
tant to the FmHA Administrator.' As program assistant, DeLong re-
tained the same pay and fringe benefits as a state director, however,
DeLong's responsibilities were reduced significantly."0 In addition,
DeLong's transfer to program assistant required travel for extended
periods on short notice." DeLong brought suit in federal district court
alleging that his reassignment and responsibility reduction violated his
first amendment right to free political affiliation under the Supreme
Court's decision in Elrod v. Burns.12
Elrod v. Burns is the seminal case on political patronage employees'
first amendment rights. In Elrod, the Supreme Court held that absent
' Id. The Carter administration created the program assistant position to accom-
modate Republican state directors who refused to resign and could not be dismissed
because of their status as "preference eligible employees" under the Veteran's Preference
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 7511-12 (1976). See 621 F.2d at 621; Letter from Bob Bergland to Alan
K. Campbell (July 20, 1977), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 4, at 48-49; note 4 supra
(discussing when "preference eligible employees" subject to dismissal under Veteran's
Preference Act). Permitting the transfer of employees protected from dismissal under the
Veteran's Preference Act could result in government waste if the protected employees are
transferred to figurehead positions. See text accompanying notes 48-51 infra (discussing
government waste resulting from figurehead transfers).
"0 621 F.2d at 621. As a state director, DeLong was charged with responsibility over
175 employees, and was empowered to distribute $130 million in federal loans annually. Id.
DeLong also planned and organized various agricultural programs in Maine. Id. As program
assistant, DeLong did not have a secretary or staff, did not receive long term assignments,
and performed duties normally assigned to personnel with ranks lower than his own. Id.;
see Appendix, supra note 4, at 32-33.
" 621 F.2d at 621. Between October 24, 1979 and February 3, 1980, DeLong received
fourteen job location transfers. See Appendix, supra note 4, at 32-33 (detailing the changes
in DeLong's job location while employed as program assistant).
" Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). DeLong sought temporary and permanent in-
junctive relief for reinstatement as a state director. DeLong v. United States, No. 78-924-A
(E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 1978 (mem.) at 3, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 4, at 312, 315. The
district court denied DeLong's motion for injunctive relief because DeLong had not ex-
hausted his administrative remedies. Id. DeLong then filed for review before the Federal
Employee Appeals Authority (FEAA). Id. The FEAA held that DeLong's transfer did not
violate his rights under the Veteran's Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1976). DeLong v.
United States, No. 78-924-A, (mem.) at 3, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 4, at 315; see
text accompanying note 4 supra (DeLong's claim under Veteran's Preference Act). DeLong
appealed the FEAA decision to federal district court, arguing that he was denied pro-
cedural due process guaranteed to "preference eligible employees" under the Veteran's
Preference Act, and that his transfer abridged his first amendment right of free political af-
filiation. DeLong v. United States, No. 78-924-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 1978) (mem.) at 1,
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 4, at 312. The district court affirmed the FEAA holding
that DeLong's transfer did not violate DeLong's rights under the Veteran's Preference Act
or abridge DeLong's right to belong to a pariticular political party. Id. at 320.
"3 See 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Elrod v. Burns was the first Supreme Court case to define
the first amendment rights of political patronage employees. The plaintiffs in Elrod were
Republican Party members who worked in the Cook County, Illinois Sheriffs Department.,
Id. at 350. Elrod, a Democrat, was elected Cook County Sheriff. Id. When Elrod assumed of-
fice, he dismissed or threatened to dismiss several Republican Sheriffs Department
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an overriding interest, the first amendment prohibits government of-
ficials from denying benefits such as continued employment to a govern-
ment employee, if the sole ground for denying the benefit is the
employee's political affiliation." The Elrod Court found that the govern-
ment's interest in employing persons loyal to a particular political party
overrides a patronage employee's first amendment rights when political
loyalty is required to implement the elected official's programs ef-
fectively."5 The Court held that government officials may dismiss only
employees solely because of their political affiliations. Id. at 351. The plaintiffs in Elrod
alleged that their dismissal or threatened dismissal violated their first amendment right to
free political affiliation. Id. at 350. The Supreme Court held that absent an overriding
governmental interest, political patronage dismissals abridge employees' first amendment
rights by forcing employees to adopt an elected official's political beliefs at the expense of
their own political beliefs. Id. at 355. Elrod is a paradigm case of coercing employees to
adhere to an elected official's political beliefs, because Sheriff Elrod reinstated all
Republicans who either joined the Democratic Party, or obtained sponsorship letters from
Democratic Party members. Id. at 364 n.18.
1 Id. at 360. The Supreme Court cases Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), provide the constitutional basis for
Elrod's holding that the first amendment protects a government employee from dismissal
based solely on the employee's political affiliation. In Keyishian, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring college professors to sign a
certificate declaring that they were not Communist Party members. Id. at 593. The New
York State government asserted that the statute furthered an important interest by
preventing the state from hiring "subversives." Id. at 592. The New York government
argued that the statute did not abridge teachers' first amendment rights on the ground that
the statute denied employment rather than first amendment rights. Id. at 605. The
Keyishian Court rejected the government's argument, holding that the state cannot deny
the benefit of government employment if, by denying the benefit, the government infringes
upon an employee's first amendment rights. Id. at 606.
In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), a state-employed junior college professor
claimed that the state did not renew his contract solely because he had made public
statements criticizing his school's policies. Id. at 595. Sindermann asserted that his
dismissal violated his first amendment right to freedom of speech. Id. The Supreme Court
held that the state could not deny Sindermann the benefit of government employment if the
denial was grounded upon Sindermann's exercise of first amendment free speech rights. Id.
at 598.
Keyishian and Sindermann apply to political patronage dismissals because such
dismissals deny persons the benefit of government employment solely on the basis of their
political affiliation. The first amendment protects free political affiliation rights. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (first amendment protects political association).
Political patronage dismissals deny government employees the benefit of continued employ-
ment by conditioning employment upon surrendering the first amendment right of free
political affiliation. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 355.
,1 427 U.S. at 367. The petitioners alleged that political patronage transfers serve
three overriding governmental interests. First, the petitioners argued that the government
has an interest in employing persons loyal to the political party in office on the ground that
loyal employees are necessary for effective emplementation of the elected official's pro-
grams and policies. Id. at 367. The Supreme Court held that by electing an official, voters
constructively approve the official's programs. Id. The Court reasoned that employees who
do not adhere to an elected official's programs could undermine the programs by obstruct-
ing their implementation. Id. The Court held, however, that limiting patronage dismissals to
19811
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policy making employees solely on political grounds, because non-policy
makers cannot undermine an elected official's programs."
In DeLong, the district court found that FmHA state directors are
policy makers under Elrod.17 Therefore, the court held that the first
amendment did not protect DeLong from transfer because under Elrod,
DeLong was not protected from dismissal. 8 DeLong appealed to the
Fourth Circuit. 9
After argument of DeLong's appeal, but before the Fourth Circuit
reached a decision, the Supreme Court decided Branti v. Finkel." In
Branti, the Supreme Court redefined the Elrod "policy maker" test." The
Court held that the government's interest in employing persons loyal to
a particular political party overrides a patronage employee's first
amendment rights when "the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of the
public office involved."' The Fourth Circuit remanded DeLong to the
policy making employees would serve the government's interest through the least burden-
some means. Id.
The peitioners also argued that political patronage dismissals promote efficient govern-
ment operations. Id. at 364. The petitioners charged that employees not loyal to the political
party in power lack incentive to work effectively. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the peti-
tioners' argument on the ground that wholesale replacement of government employees with
every change in political administrations causes more government inefficiency than results
from employing persons not loyal to the political party in office. Id.
The final argument of the Elrod petitioners was that patronage dismissals preserve
the party system. Id. at 368. The petitioners alleged that the party system relies upon
patronage appointments for its existance. Id. The Supreme Court held that prohibiting
patronage dismissals would not cause the party system to deteriorate. Id. at 369.
II Id.; see text accompanying note 15 supra (discussing the rationale for limiting
patronage dismissals to policy making employees).
'" DeLong v. United States, No. 78-924-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 1978) (mem.) at 9,
reprinted in Appendix, supra note 4, at 320.
I' !d.
19 DeLong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 622; see Branti v. Finkel, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).
21 100 S. Ct. at 1289.
2 Id. In Branti, the Rockland County, New York Public Defender threatened to
dismiss Assistant Public Defenders who were not Democratic Party members. Id. The
district court held that the Assistant Public Defenders could not be dismissed on political
patronage grounds because Assistant Public Defenders are not "policy makers" under the
Elrod test. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Supreme Court
held, however, that the proper inquiry for determining whether a particular government
employee may be dismissed on political grounds is not whether the employee is a policy
maker, but whether effective job performance requires a particular political affiliation. Id.
at 1295. The premise of the Supreme Court's holding in Branti is that party affiliation does
not affect every policy making position. Id. Under Branti, some policy making employees re-
main subject to political patronage dismissal. Id.
While Branti redefined the Elrod "policy maker" test, the constitutional basis for
upholding patronage dismissals in Branti and Elrod is identical. Branti and Elrod both
recognize that absent an overriding governmental interest, the government may not deny a
benefit solely because of an employee's political affiliation. Branti v. Finkel, 100 S. Ct. 1200,
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district court with instructions to determine whether DeLong's state
directorship carried first amendment protection under Branti. The
Fourth Circuit declined to indicate how Branti should apply to DeLong
on remand, or to comment on the differences between Elrod's "policy
maker" test and Branti's "appropriate requirement" test. 4
Although the court did not determine whether DeLong was a pro-
tected employee under Branti, the Fourth Circuit did address the issue
of whether the Elrod and Branti prohibition of some political patronage
dismissals applies to political patronage transfers.' The government
argued that DeLong's transfer did not abridge DeLong's first amend-
ment right to free political affiliation because Elrod applies only to
political patronage dismissals. 6 The Fourth Circuit rejected the govern-
ment's argument, and held Elrod and Branti guarantee first amendment
protection from political patronage burdens other than dismissal.'
The DeLong court looked to Elrod and Branti for guidance in deter-
mining when the first amendment protects a government official from
political patronage transfer. 8 The court found that Elrod and Branti
rested on the principal that the government may not deny a person the
benefit of government employment solely because of that person's
political affiliation.' The court found that Elrod and Branti prohibited
political patronage dismissals, because such dismissals provide the
government a method of indirectly denying persons the benefit of con-
tinued government employment by forcing employees to choose between
losing their positions, and surrendering their first amendment right of
free political affiliation.2 Therefore, the DeLong court held that Branti
and Elrod protect government employees from political patronage
transfer only when transfer is the substantial equivalent of dismissal.2
1294 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976). Branti and Elrod differ only in their
determinination of when the government's interest outweighs the employee's first amend-
ment rights.




Id. at 623. In DeLong, the Fourth Circuit found Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993
(4th Cir. 1978), relevant regarding the application of Elrod and Branti to political patronage
transfers. 621 F.2d at 623. In Johnson, the former FmHA state director for North Carolina
brought an action identical to DeLong's. 586 F.2d 994-95. The Johnson court held that if
state directors are not policy makers under Elrod, their political patronage grounded
transfers are unconstitutional. Id. at 995. The Fourth Circuit determined that the Johnson
decision was not controlling in DeLong because the only issue in Johnson was the district
court's denial of temporary injunctive relief. 621 F.2d at 623 n.5.
621 F.2d at 623.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 14 & 22 supra.
621 F.2d at 623; see text accompanying notes 14 & 22 supra.
31 Id. at 623-24. The Fourth Circuit cited several federal district court decisions
protecting government employees from discrimination based on political affiliation. See id.
1981]
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Thus, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a government employee who may
not be dismissed under Branti may not be transferred if the transfer
forces the employee to choose between resignation and exercising his
first amendment right to free political affiliation.32
The DeLong court did not rule on the constitutionality of DeLong's
transfer.3 The court did establish, however, guidelines for determining
when transfers and dismissals are equivalent.3 4 The Fourth Circuit held
that a determination of whether a political patronage transfer is con-
stitutionally permissable requires analysis of the patronage employee's
objective and subjective expectations regarding job assignments and
employment location.3 5 The DeLong court found that a patronage
employee's reasonable objective expectations regarding job assignments
and employment location should not be considered to exceed those of
employees similarly situated in private employment. 8 The court ruled
that a government employee's subjective reliance on reasonable expec-
tations is relevant in determining the constitutionality of a patronage
transfer insofar as the official effecting the transfer has actual or con-
structive knowledge of those subjective expectations. 7 The greater a
government official's knowledge concerning a patronage employee's sub-
jective reliance on continued employment, the more likely the transfer is
unconstitutional under DeLong.'
While the DeLong court's standard for determining when an elected
official may transfer an employee on political patronage grounds is
vague, the test clearly protects an employee from a transfer that im-
poses an unreasonable burden upon him.39 The Fourth Circuit's test,
however, is unclear concerning whether the first amendment protects a
at 622 n.4; see, e.g., Miller v. Board of Ed., 450 F. Supp. 106, 110 (S.D. W. Va. 1978) (transfer
and demotion of school principal); DeLuca v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736, 741 (D. Mass. 1977)
(denial of promotion to police officer); Cullen v. New York, 435 F. Supp. 546, 532 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (forced political contributions).






I See id. A transfer that requires an employee to perform more hours of work for the
same pay denies the employee the benefit of his former hourly wage. The first amendment
prohibits such a transfer becaue the transfer forces an employee to choose between resigna-
tion or working at a reduced hourly wage, and exercising the right to belong to a particular
political party. See text accompanying note 14 supra (discussing constitutional prohibition
against denying benefits when denial infringes on first amendment rights).
Not all transfers to positions carrying increased duties without proportional pay in-
creases are unreasonable. An employee transferred to a position carrying increased duties
might choose to remain in his new position if the transfer involved increased prestige. Such
a transfer would not be unconstitutional because the transfer would not force the transfer-
red employee to resign. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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patronage employee from a transfer to a figurehead position.4" The
DeLong test is based on the principle that the government cannot deny
a benefit to an employee solely because of the employee's political
beliefs." Transferring an employee to a position with equal pay but with
reduced responsibilities does not appear to deny any tangible benefits to
an employee, because such a transfer requires less work for the same
pay. 2 Figurehead transfers do, however, deny intangible benefits such
as prestige and job satisfaction."3 Prestige and job satisfaction probably
are not protected benefits under Elrod and Branti." Nevertheless,
transferring employees to positions carrying reduced prestige and little
challenge could force employees to resign. Many government employees
are highly trained professionals whose motivation exceeds monetary
compensation. 5 Courts could conclude that professional integrity forces
employees who are transferred to trivial positions to choose between
resigning and belonging to the newly elected official's political party. 6
Therefore, the first amendment may prohibit transferring a government
employee to a figurehead position, not because job prestige and respon-
sibility are protected benefits per se, but because by indirectly forcing
an employee to resign, such a transfer may deny the employee the
benefit of continued employment solely because of his political affilia-
tion."7
" See 621 F.2d at 624. In DeLong, the Fourth Circuit did not distinguish unreasonably
burdensome and figurehead transfers. The court merely held that a transfer which forces an
employee to resign is unconstitutional. Id. Therefore, DeLong's transfer could be un-
constitutional on the ground that program assistants have so few duties that a reasonable
man in DeLong's position would resign rather than remain in office. Id.; see text accompany-
ing note 10 supra (detailing DeLong's duties as program assistant).
' See text accompanying notes 14 & 30-32 supra.
C' f. text accompanying note 39 supra (unreasonably burdensome transfers deny
benefits).
', See 621 F.2d at 621 (DeLong's claim that figurehead transfers are unconstitutional).
See also text accompanying note 10 supra (detailing DeLong's duties as program assistant).
" While the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the government may not deny a
benefit if the denial infringes upon first amendment rights, the Court has not considered the
constitutionality of denying benefits other than continued employment. See text
accompanying notes 13, 14 & 22 supra.
See 621 F.2d at 621.
" In DeLong, the Fourth Circuit did not indicate whether reduced responsibility could
be so great as to force transferred employees to resign. If a loss of responsibility forces a
transferred employee to resign, the employee has been denied a benefit. See note 14 supra.
If a transfer denies a benefit solely because of the transferee's political affiliation, the
transfer is unconstitutional, whether the transfer imposed unreasonable duties or reduced
responsibility. Id. See also text accompanying note 44 supra. Under DeLong, however, a
political patronage transfer is not unconstitutional if the transferred employee's decision to
resign is unreasonable. 621 F.2d at 624.
4? DeLong did not argue that his transfer forced his resignation. 621 F.2d at 621.
DeLong argued that his job prestige and responsibility were constitutionally protected
benefits. Id. While responsibility and prestige arguably are protected benefits, a stronger
argument is that figurehead transfers force employees to resign, thus denying the benefit of
continued employment. See text accompanying notes 14 & 22 supra. But see text accompany-
1981]
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If DeLong permits figurehead transfers, the Fourth Circuit may
have paved a road leading to government waste.48 In Elrod, the Supreme
Court recognized the waste caused by the wholesale replacement of
government employees accompanying changes in administrations.49 The
Court believed that limiting the class of employees subject to political
patronage dismissal would reduce government waste generated by
political patronage practices."0 Unless courts interpret DeLong as pro-
hibiting figurehead transfers, Elrod and Branti will increase govern-
ment waste by encouraging incoming politicians to create meaningless
jobs to accommodate government employees who cannot be dismissed.5
Delong v. United States is important because the Fourth Circuit ex-
panded the first amendment protection of political patronage employees
to include protection fr6m unreasonable transfers.52 Nevertheless, th6
Fourth Circuit's standard for determining when transfers are un-
reasonable is vague regarding the constitutionality of figurehead
transfers. While sound constitutional arguments exist both for and
against the constitutionality of figurehead transfers, courts should inter-
pret DeLong as prohibiting figurehead transfers to avoid potential
governmental waste. 4
SAMUEL N. ALLEN
ing note 44 supra. The argument that figurehead transfers force employees to resign is
stronger than the argument that responsibility and prestige are protected benefits because
forced resignations are equivalent to dismissals under DeLong. See 621 F.2d at 623-24.
" See text accompanying note 51 infra.
" 427 U.S. at 364-65.
Id. at 367.
5, Whenever the government establishes a class of employees who cannot be dis-
missed, the government creates the potential for government waste. The application of the
Veteran's Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1976) to DeLong's transfer illustrates the govern-
ment waste that protecting government employees from dismissal produces. The Veteran's
Preference Act prohibits the dismissal of "preference eligible employees" who have
diligently performed their duties. Id. § 2108, 7511-12. The Carter administration created the
position of program assistant to accommodate FmHA state directors who could not be
dismissed because of their job protection under the Act. See note 9 supra. Considerable
evidence exists to indicate that program assistants are figurehead appointees. See text ac-
companying notes 9-11 supra. Thus, the Veteran's Preference Act generated government
waste by encouraging the creation of a meaningless position to accommodate government
employees protected from dismissal.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Elrod and Branti created a class of government
employees who cannot be dismissed. See text accompanying notes 13 & 22 supra. The Elrod
and Branti decisions, like the Veteran's Preference Act, encourage the creation of
figurehead positions. Courts do not have power to override congressional enactments that
produce government waste. Courts do, however, have the power to assess the constitu-
tionality of political patronage transfers. Since a strong constitutional argument exists to
prohibit figurehead transfers, courts should hold such transfers unconstitutional in order to
avoid government waste. See text accompanying notes 40-47 (discussing constitutional basis
for prohibiting figurehead transfers).
621 F.2d at 623; see text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
See text accompanying notes 34-40 supra.
See text accompanying notes 41-51 supra.
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B. First Amendment Protection of Adult Establishments
The first amendment to the United States Constitution enibodies the
concept that free exchange. of ideas is essential in a democratic society.1
The fourteenth amendment protects first amendment rights by prohibit-
ing states from enacting laws discriminating arbitrarily among kinds of
expression.2 The Supreme Court has held, however, that first and four-
teenth amendment rights are not absolute.' States may enact laws sup-
pressing expression and discriminating among kinds of expression if the
laws serve an overriding governmental interest.4 Thus, courts must
strike a delicate balance between first amendment free speech rights,
fourteenth amendment equal protection rights, and overriding govern-
mental interests when assessing the constitutionality of regulations af-
fecting free speech.' Free speech issues commonly arise in litigation
challenging state obscenity and poronography laws." In Hart Book
Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten' the Fourth Circuit upheld a North Carolina
criminal statute prohibiting operation of two "adult establishments" in
the same building over first and fourteenth amendment challenges."
The Hart statute defines adult establishments as adult book stores,'
adult motion picture theatres, 10 and adult mini-motion picture theatres,"
' See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63-64 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951).
'E.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100.
See note 4 infra (cases holding first and fourteenth amendment rights not absolute).
See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360, 363 (1976) (first amendment rights not ab-
solute); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1976) (governmental
authority to regulate speech depends upon content of speech); Police Dept. of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-100 (1972) (fourteenth amendment permits regulations
discriminating among types of speech if discrimination is rationally related to important
governmental interest).
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 362-63.
See, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 768 (1977) (challenging Illinois anti-
pornography statute as abridging bookstore owner's first amendment rights); Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 55 (1976) (first amendment challenge to zoning or-
dinance prohibiting adult establishment from operating within 1,000 feet of another adult
establishment); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 110 (1972) (first amendment challenge to
California statute prohibiting sale of alcoholic beverages in adult establishments).
7 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979).
'Id. at 825-26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.11 (Supp. 1979).
Title 14, Section 202.10(1) of the North Carolina Code defines an adult bookstore as a
bookstore having a preponderance of its publications emphasizing certain defined acts or
anatomical areas. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.10(1) (Supp. 1979); see note 12 infra.
'0 Title 14, Section 202.10(3) of the North Carolina Code defines an adult motion picture
theatre as an indoor motion picture theatre, having a capacity of 50 or more persons, that
presents motion pictures a preponderance of which emphasize certain defined sexual acts or
anatomical areas. N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 14-202.10(3) (Supp. 1979); see note 12 infra.
" Title 14, Section 202.10(4) of the North Carolina Code defines an adult mini-motion
picture theatre as an indoor motion picture theatre with a capacity of fewer than 50 per-
sons, that presents motion pictures, a preponderance of which emphasize certain sexual acts
or anatomical areas. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.10(4); see note 12 infra.
1981]
496 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
selling a preponderance of goods emphasizing certain defined anatomical
areas.12 The statute also prohibits adult establishments from selling sex-
ual devices, including contraceptives. 13 Two adult establishment owners,
in separate suits, challenged the Hart statute in the United States
District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of North
Carolina. 4 The plaintiffs argued that the statute abridged their first and
fourteenth amendment free speech and free press rights, and violated
the fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantee. 5 The Eastern
and Western Districts of North Carolina held that the Hart statute un-
justifiably intruded into businesses dealing in materials having first
amendment protection. 6 The district courts also held that the statute
violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee by
regulating adult establishments without similarly regulating non-adult
establishments. 7 Finally, the Eastern and Western Districts of North
1" Title 14, Section 202.10(8) of the North Carolina Code defines specified anatomical
areas, to include human genitals, human pubic regions, human buttocks, female breasts
below the areola, and human male genitals in a turgid state. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.10(8)
(Supp. 1979). "Specified sexual activities" are defined as the stimulation of human genitals,
human masturbation, sexual intercourse, and fondling of human genitals, pubic regions, but-
tocks or female breasts. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.10(9) (Supp. 1979).
,3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.107) (Supp. 1979).
" Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F.Supp. 904 (E.D.N.C. 1978); U.T., Inc. v. Ed-
misten, Nos. 77-365 and 77-366 (W.D.N.C. July 24, 1978).
" Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. at 906; U.T. Inc. v. Edmisten, Nos.
77-365 and 77-366, slip op. at 4-5. In addition to arguing that § 14-202.11 of the North
Carolina Code is unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments, the plaintiffs
in Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten and U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten argued that § 14-202.11 is
unconstitutionally vague, and infringes upon the constitutionally protected right to privacy.
Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. at 906; U.T. Inc. V. Edmisten, Nos. 77-365
and 77-366, slip op. at 5. In Hart Book Stores, the Eastern District of North Carolina held
that addressing the plaintiffs' vagueness and right to privacy claims was unnecessary
because the court held that § 14-202.11 abridged the plaintiffs' first and fourteenth amend-
ment free speech and equal protection rights. 450 F. Supp. at 906. In U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten,
however, the Western District of North Carolina held § 14-202.11 unconstitutionally vague
on the ground that the statute does not make clear when a book or film has an "emphasis"
on sexual acts, and does not make clear what constitutes a single "building, premises, struc-
ture, or other facility." U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten, Nos. 77-365 and 77-366, slip op. at 5.
In addition to holding the North Carolina statute unconstitutionally vague, the
Western District of North Carolina held that the statute violates the constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy. Id- Section 14-202.11 prohibits contraceptive sales in adult
establishments. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.11 (Supp. 1979). In Carey v. Population Serv. Intl,
431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Supreme Court held a New York statute prohibiting contraceptive
sales except by licensed pharmacists unconstitutional because the New York statute reduced
the availability of contraceptives, thus abridging the public's right to choose whether to con-
ceive offspring. Id- at 689. In UT., Inc., the Western District of North Carolina held that §
14-202.11 also abridges the public's right of choosing whether to conceive offspring, and is
thus unconstitutional. U.T., Inc., v. Edmisten, Nos. 77-365 and 77-366, slip op. at 5. But see
note 19 infra (Fourth Circuit's analysis of plaintiffs' vagueness and right to privacy claims).
"I Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. at 907; U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten, Nos.
77-365 and 77-366, slip op. at 2.
"' Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. at 904, 908; U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten,
Nos. 77-365 and 77-366, slip op. at 4.
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Carolina held that the Hart statute imposed an unconstitutional
economic burden on the sale of adult materials.'8 The State appealed to
the Fourth Circuit in a consolidated action. 9
The Fourth Circuit held that the Hart statute does not violate the
first amendment's free speech and press guarantees.2' In upholding the
" In Hart Book Stores and UT., Inc., the Eastern and Western Districts of North
Carolina held that the Hart statute was designed to force adult establishments to close by
reducing the establishments' profit margins. 450 F. Supp. at 908; U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten,
Nos. 77-365 and 77-366, slip op. at 2.
, Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979).
612 F.2d at 823. In addition to holding that the Hart statute does not violate the first
amendment's free speech and press guarantees, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district
courts' holdings that the Hart statute is unconstitutionally vague and that the Hart statute
abridges the constitutionally protected right to privacy. Id. But see note 15 supra (district
court's analysis in holding Hart statute unconstitutionally vague, and an unconstitutional
burden on right to privacy).
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. American Mini-
Theatres, Inc, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) in holding that the plaintiffs in Hart Book Stores lacked
standing to challenge the North Carolina statute for unconstitutional vagueness. 612 F.2d at
833. In Mini-Theatres, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge a Detroit zoning ordinance for vagueness because the ordinance clearly applied to
the plaintiffs' businesses. 427 U.S. at 59. Thus, the Mini-Theatres Court held that persons
do not have standing to challenge a statute for vagueness unless the persons are affected by
the statute's vagueness. Id.
In Mini-Theatres, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the rule that those
not affected by a statute's alleged vagueness do not have standing to challenge the statute.
Id at 59-60. The exception gives standing to such persons where the statute's very ex-
istence may cause persons to refrain from engaging in expressions having first amendment
protection. Id at 60. The statute's burden on free expression must be "real and substantial,"
and the statute must be incapable of narrow construction for the exception to apply. Id. See,
e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (applying exception to vague
ordinance regulating drive-in theatres); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-14 (1973)
(applying exception to vague state employee merit system). The Supreme Court held that
the Mini-Theatres ordinance did not meet the exception's requirements because the or-
dinance did not impose substantial burdens on free speech, and because the ordinance was
capable of narrow construction. 427 U.S. at 60-61. In Hart Book Stores, the Fourth Circuit
held that the North Carolina statute does not impose real and substantial burdens on free
expression and that the statute is capable of narrow construction. 612 F.2d at 833-34. Thus,
the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs in Hart Book Stores did not fall under the stand-
ing exception recognized by the Supreme Court in Mini-Theatres. Id. at 833.
In Hart, the Fourth Circuit also held that the North Carolina statute's prohibition
against selling contraceptives in adult establishments does not violate the constitutionally
protected right to privacy. Id. at 834. The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on
the Supreme Court's decision in Carey v. Population Serv. Int'L, 431 U.S. 687 (1977). 612
F.2d at 833. In Carey, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute prohibiting con-
traceptive sales except by licensed pharmacists on the ground that the statute severely
limited the public's access to contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 689. In Hart, the Fourth Circuit
distinguished Carey on the ground that the New York statute allowed only pharmacists to
sell contraceptives, while the North Carolina statute allowed all buinesses except adult
establishments to sell contraceptives. 612 F.2d at 834. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that
the North Carolina statute at issue in Hart did not abridge the constitutionally protected
right to privacy because the statute imposed no significant limitation on the availability of
contraceptives. Id
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statute against the plaintiffs' first amendment challenge,2' the Fourth
Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc.22 In Mini-Theatres, a 4-1-4 decision, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning ordinance pro-
hibiting an adult establishment from operating within 1,000 feet of
another adult establishment, or within 500 feet of a zoned residential
area.2" Two adult theatre owners challenged the Mini-Theatres or-
dinance as an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression having first
amendment protection, and as an abridgement of their fourteenth
amendment equal protection rights.24
Four Justices upheld the Detroit zoning ordinance at issue in Mini-
Theatres against the plaintiffs' first amendment challenge on the ground
that adult materials do not have first amendment protection equivalent
to the constitutional protection afforded other classes of speech.' The
Mini-Theatres plurality held that Detroit's interest in protecting urban
neighborhoods from decay outweighed the plaintiffs' first amendment
rights.2" In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell reasoned that the
Detroit zoning ordinance at issue in Mini-Theatres is a valid land use
regulation having only an incidental effect on the plaintiffs' first amend-
ment rights.' Justice Powell reasonsed that a government regulation
having an incidental effect on first amendment rights is justified if the
regulation meets the United States v. O'Brien' test."
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court found that some physical acts have
both speech and nonspeech elements. 0 The Court held that states may
regulate an act's nonspeech element to the detriment of first amendment
rights if certain criteria are met.31 First, the regulation must be a legally
"I 612 F.2d at 826.
427 U.S. 50 (1976).
2 Id. The Mini-Theatres ordinance defines 11 regulated "uses". Id. at 52 n.3. In addition
to adult bookstores, adult motion picture theatres, and adult mini-motion picture theatres,
the Mini-Theatres ordinance regulates saloons, motels, pawn shops, pool halls, public lodg-
ing houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, taxi stands and dance halls. Id
' 427 U.S. at 55-56. In addition to challenging the Mini-Theatres ordinance on first and
fourteenth amendment grounds, the plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as unconstitutionally
vague. Id at 56. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
Mini-Theatres ordinance for vagueness because the ordinance's alleged vagueness did not
affect the plaintiffs' businesses. Id at 59-61; see note 19 supra (discussing Supreme Court's
Mini-Theatres holding that persons not affected by a statute's vagueness have no standing
to challenge the statute).
427 U.S. at 70.
Id. at 62-63.
Id. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
2' 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
427 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
In O'Brien, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 462(b)(3) of the
Universal Military Training and Service Act (the Act), 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1948) as amended
by Pub. L. No. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586 (1965) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3) (1980).
391 U.S. at 372. Section 462(b)(3) of the Act prohibits draft card destruction or mutilation.
"' See 391 U.S. at 376-77.
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permissible exercise of the government's power. 2 Second, the regulation
must further an important governmental interest.' Third, the govern-
mental interest which the regulation furthers may not be related to sup-
pression of free expression." Finally, the burdens on first amendment
rights may not be greater than necessary to further the state interest.'
Justice Powell reasoned that the Detroit ordinance met the O'Brien test,
emphasizing that the ordinance was within Detroit's police power to pro-
tect public health and safety.
The Fourth Circuit found the Hart statute identical to the Mini-
Theatres ordinance in all relevant respects." Therefore, the Hart court
held that as a matter of stare decisis, the Supreme Court's decision in
Mini-Theatres was dispositive in determining the constitutionality of the
Hart statute.' The Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning in Justice
Powell's Mini-Theatres concurrence in upholding the Hart statute
against the plaintiffs' first amendment challenge. 9 The Hart court held
that the North Carolina statute meets the O'Brien test because the
statute is a valid exercise of North Carolina's police power to protect
public health and safety" and furthers an important governmental in-
' Id. at 77.
3 Id.
Id.
427 U.S. at 79-82.
612 F.2d at 824-25.
Id at 825.
Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell reasoned that the Detroit zoning or-
dinance at issue in Mini-Theatres did not violate first amendment guarantees because the
ordinance met the United States v. O'Brien test. 427 U.S. at 80-82; see United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (detailing elements of O'Brien test); text accompanying notes 40-43
infra. Justice Powell found that the Mini-Theatres ordinance met the O'Brien test because
the ordinance was a valid exercise of Detroit's police power and furthered a legitimate
governmental interest in preventing urban decay. 427 U.S. at 80. Justice Powell also deter-
mined that the Mini-Theatres ordinance was not related to suppression of free expression
because the ordinance had validly regulated non-adult establishments for ten years before
being amended to regulate adult establishments. Id. Finally, Justice Powell decided that the
Mini-Theatres ordinance imposed minimum burdens on free expression. Id. at 81-82. The
Hart court noted that the North Carolina statute and the Mini-Theatres ordinance use
similar terms to define the activities subject to regulation. 612 F.2d at 824-25. Compare 427
U.S. at 52-54 nn.1-6 (Mini-Theatres ordinance), with 612 F.2d at 822-23 n.1 (Hart statute). The
court ruled that neither the Hart statute nor the Mini-Theatres ordinance limits the total
number of adult establishments permitted to operate, restricts adult establishment opera-
tion to a specific geographic region, nor prohibits the sale of any type of adult material. 612
F.2d at 827. The Fourth Circuit also found that both the Hart statute and the Mini-Theatres
ordinance are directed against techniques of marketing adult materials and are designed to
disperse the unhealthful secondary effects that accompany adult establishments. Id. at 826.
Thus, the Hart court held that the North Carolina statute, like the Mini-Theatres ordinance,
is a valid exercise of police power, regulating the time, place, and manner of expression,
with a minimal burden on first amendment rights. Id. at 827.
612 F.2d at 827.
1981]
500 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
terest by preventing urban decay.4 The Fourth Circuit held also that
North Carolina's interest in preventing urban decay is not related to
suppression of free expression,4" and that the Hart statute does not
burden free expression more than necessary to further North Carolina's
interest in preventing urban decay.43
The Fourth Circuit also held that the Hart statute does not violate
the first amendment by imposing unconstitutional economic burdens on
materials having first amendment protection.44 The Hart court held that
regulations designed to promote public welfare are constitutional, even
if the regulations are economically detrimental to affected businesses.4"
The Fourth Circuit recognized that the first amendment limits the
economic burdens that regulations may impose upon materials having
first amendment protection. 6 The court held, however, that the eco-
nomic burdens which the Hart statute imposes upon adult establish-
ments are not unconstitutionally stringent.
7
In addition to holding that the Hart statute does not violate the first
amendment, the Fourth Circuit held that the Hart statute does not
violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee. 8 The
'1 Id. at 828.
,2 Id. at 829. The Eastern District of North Carolina held that the Hart statute was
related to suppression of free expression because the North Carolina Legislature enacted
the statute with a design to harm adult establishments economically. Hart Book Stores, Inc.
v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. 904, 907 (E.D.N.C. 1978); see text accompanying note 18 supra.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the third O'Brien criterion's proper focus is not
on legislative motive, but on the relationship between the governmental interest that a
statute furthers and the suppression of free expression. 612 F.2d at 829; see United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
612 F.2d at 827.
" Id.; see text accompanying note 18 supra.
"' 612 F.2d at 827.
46 I&
41 Id. at 827-28. The Fourth Circuit only considered the cost of converting adult
establishments selling a variety of adult materials into establishments selling a single adult
material in holding that the Hart statute does not impose constitutional economic burdens
on adult establishments. Id. The Hart court held that statutes imposing relocation costs are
not unreasonable. Id. at 827; accord, Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d
709, 722, 585 P.2d 1153, 1160 (1978), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 946 (1979), (choice between moving
theatre to new location or showing non-adult movies not unconstitutional economic burden
of first amendment rights). But see text accompanying note 18 supra; text accompanying
notes 65-67 infra (Hart statute affects adult establishments' profits).
, 612 F.2d at 830. The Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on Police Dept.
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), in holding that the Hart statute does not violate the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee. 612 F.2d at 832. In Mosley, the
Supreme Court struck down a Chicago ordinance prohibiting all picketing near Chicago
schools except labor dispute picketing. 408 U.S. at 94. The Court held the Chicago or-
dinance's discrimination between types of picketing unconstitutional because the
discrimination was based solely upon the words appearing on picket signs. Id. at 95. The
Mosley Court held that prohibiting non-labor dispute picketing could be justified only if
Chicago could demonstrate that non-labor dispute picketing disrupts school operations more
than does labor dispute picketing. Id. at 100. Since Chicago could not demonstrate that non-
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Fourth Circuit ruled that under Mini-Theatres, statutes incidentally af-
fecting free speech may classify and regulate businesses differently if a
rational relationship exists between the classification and an important
governmental interest." The Hart court found a rational relation be-
tween the North Carolina statute's unequal regulation of adult and non-
adult establishments and the state's interest in preventing urban decay,
because non-adult establishments do not produce the undesirable effects
that adult establishments produce."
The Supreme Court's decision in Mini-Theatres bound the Fourth
Circuit to uphold the Hart statute against the plaintiffs' constitutional
challenges absent distinctions between the Hart statute and the Mini-
Theatres ordinance. While the Fourth Circuit found the Hart statute
identical to the Mini-Theatres ordinance in all relevant respects, impor-
tant distinctions exist between the two." First, the method of dispersing
the location of adult establishments in the Hart statute arguably does
not further North Carolina's interest in preventing urban decay."
labor dispute picketing was uncommonly disruptive, the Court held that the Chicago or-
dinance unconstitutionally discriminated against the content of expression. Id. at 99-100.
In Hart Book Stores, the plaintiffs alleged that the North Carolina statute, like the
Chicago ordinance struck down in Mosley, unconstitutionally discriminates against expres-
sion solely on the basis of the expression's content. 612 F.2d at 832. In rejecting the plain-
tiffs' argument, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Mosley, holding that the Chicago or-
dinance was not rationally related to an important governmental interest. Id.
41 612 F.2d at 831-32; see Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring) (regulating adult establishments more stringently than non-adult es-
tablishments is rationally related to preventing urban decay). In Hart Book Stores, the
Fourth Circuit distinguished between statutes directly burdening first amendment rights,
and regulations incidentally burdening first amendment rights. 612 F.2d at 831 & n.13. A
discriminatory regulation that directly burdens first amendment rights is constitutional
under the fourteenth amendment only if the regulation serves a compelling governmental
interest through the least burdensome means. Id.; see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
337 (1972) (voter registration statute requiring one year residency to vote did not further
compelling state interest); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (striking down, on
equal protection grounds, statutes requiring long term state residency to receive state
welfare benefits). Discriminatory zoning and police power regulations having only an in-
cidental effect on first amendment rights are constitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment if a rational relationship exists between the discriminatory classification and an impor-
tant governmental interest. 612 F.2d at 831 n.13; see, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974) (prohibiting non-family members from dwelling in same building is ra-
tionally related to preventing urban congestion); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641
(1968) (limiting children's access to adult materials is rationally related to protecting child
welfare). The Fourth Circuit held that the Hart statute is a valid police power regulation
having an incidental effect on first amendment rights. 612 F.2d at 831. Thus, the Hart court
upheld the North Carolina statute on a finding that the statute bears a rational relation to
preventing urban decay. I&
612 F.2d at 831.
1, Id. at 826; see note 39 supra (detailing similarities between Hart statute and Mini-
Theatres ordinance); compare 427 U.S. at 53-54 nn.4-7 with 621 F.2d at 822-23 n.1.
I See text accompanying notes 54-64 infra (discussing whether Hart statute furthers
an important governmental interest).
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Second, the Hart statute's "one building, one adult establishment" re-
quirement may cause widespread closing of adult establishments in
violation of the first amendment.
3
The Fourth Circuit held that the Hart statute met the O'Brien test
because the statute was rationally related to North Carolina's interest in
preventing urban decay. 4 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland," however,
the Supreme Court held that zoning laws which limit important constitu-
tional rights must not only bear a rational relation to a valid government
interest, but also must serve that interest effectively." The Moore stan-
dard applies to Hart and Mini-Theatres because the cases involve regula-
tions limiting first amendment rights. 7 While the Mini-Theatres Court
did not adopt the Moore standard, the plurality found that the ordinance
would effectively disperse the undesirable effects that accompany the
operation of adult establishments." Therefore, Mini-Theatres implied
that regulations of adult establishments must effectively further a valid
government interest as required by the Court's decision in Moore.59
Thus, under Moore and Mini-Theatres, the Hart statute must effectively
serve North Carolina's interest in preventing urban decay to meet con-
stitutional requirements.
The Hart court found that the North Carolina statute, like the Mini-
Theatres ordinance, was designed to disperse the undesirable effects of
adult establishments by regulating the establishments' location.' The
" See text accompanying notes 65-67 infra (discussing Hart statute's economic burden
on adult establishments).
612 F.2d at 828-29.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
431 U.S. at 499-500. In Moore, the Supreme Court struck down an East Cleveland
zoning ordinance that prohibited persons not members of a single family from dwelling
together. Id. at 496-96. The Moore Court held that the ordinance violated the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause on the ground that the ordinance defined "family" in a
manner that prohibited certain blood relatives from living together. Id. at 500-01. The Court
held that while zoning regulations normally must bear only a rational relation to an impor-
tant governmental interest, regulations limiting important constitutional rights also must
effectively serve the governmental interests. Id. at 499-500. Therefore, the Moore Court
held the East Cleveland ordinance unconstitutional on the alternative ground that the or-
dinance imposed burdens upon family living arrangements without furthering East
Cleveland's interest in preventing urban congestion. Id.
See 431 U.S. at 499-500.
427 U.S. at 71.
5' Id. While the Mini-Theatres plurality found that the geograhic dispersal of adult es-
tablishments would effectively serve Detroit's interest in preventing urban decay, the
Court also held that courts should not interfere with a local government's solutions to local
problems. Id In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, however, the Supreme Court indicated
the interference with local regulations that burden important constitutional freedoms
without furthering valid government interests is appropriate. 431 U.S. at 499-500; see text
accompanying note 56 supra. The Hart statute will serve North Carolina's interest in
preventing urban decay only if the statute effectively disperses the concentration of adult
establishments. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
o 612 F.2d at 826.
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Mini-Theatres ordinance effectively disperses the location of adult
establishments by requiring a 1,000 foot separation between the es-
tablishments. 1 The Hart statute's "one building, one adult establish-
ment" method of regulating the location of adult establishments will not
effectively disperse the concentration of such establishments.2 The Hart
statute permits the operation of adult establishments in adjacent
buildings provided that each establishment offers only one adult activ-
ity." Thus, the Hart statute may cause an increase in the number of
adult establishments without dispersing them effectively if adult
establishment owners open additional establishments, each specializing
in a single adult activity."
Even if the Hart statute effectively serves North Carolina's interest
in preventing urban decay, the statute may unconstitutionally burden
adult establishments' profits by permitting only one adult activity per
adult establishment. 5 Stores permitted to market only one type of adult
activity might reap significantly fewer profits than stores permitted to
sell all types of adult materials simultaneously. The imposition of an
economic burden normally is insufficient to render a statute unconstitu-
tional. 6 If, however, the Hart statute causes the widespread closing of
adult establishments because of reduced profits, the statute is an un-
constitutional burden on adult establishments owners' first amendment
rights. 7
While the Fourth Circuit's holding that the Hart statute does not
violate adult establishment owner's first amendment rights is ques-
tionable, the court's holding that the Hart statute does not violate the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee is sound. 8 The four-
teenth amendment, unlike the first amendment, does not require that a
statute burdening first amendment rights effectively serve an important
0 See 427 U.S. at 53-54 nn.4-7 (Mini-Theatres ordinance).
612 F.2d at 822-23 n.1 (Hart statute); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.11 (Supp. 1979).
See Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 450 F. Supp. 904, 907 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (Hart
statute will increase proliferation of adult establishments).
" See text accompanying note 47 supra; text accompanying note 67 infra.
See text accompanying note 18 supra.
Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring); see
Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d at 827-28.
' In Mini-Theatres, Justice Powell reasoned that the economic burdens that the
Detroit ordinance imposed upon adult establishments did not violate the first amendment,
because the statute's economic burdens did not significantly suppress the public's access to
adult materials. 427 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring). In Hart Book Stores, the Fourth
Circuit held that the economic burdens that the North Carolina statute imposes on adult
establishments are not overly burdensome. 612 F.2d at 827-28. The Hart court, however,
only considered the economic burden of converting adult establishments selling a Variety of
adult materials into stores specializing in a single adult activity. Id; see text accompanying
note 47 supra. If the Hart statute causes widespread closings of adult establishments
because of reduced profits, the statute will unconstitutionally restrict the public's access to
adult materials. 427 U.S. at 77-78 (Powell, J., concurring).
11 See Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d at 830.
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governmental interest.9 The fourteenth amendment requires only that a
rational relationship exist between the unequal classification of expres-
sion and an important governmental interest." The Hart statute and the
Mini-Theatres ordinance have an identical rational relation to the
government's interest in preventing urban decay.7 Both the Hart
statute and the Mini-Theatres ordinance regulate adult establishments
more stringently than non-adult establishments because non-adult
establishments do not cause urban decay. 2 Therefore, under Mini-
Theatres, the Hart statute does not violate the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection guarantee, even if the Hart statute violates the first
amendment.
7 3
While the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. American Mini-
Theatres, Inc. supports the Fourth Circuit's holding that the statute at
issue in Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten does not abridge fourteenth
amendment equal protection rights, the Fourth Circuit's application of
Mini-Theatres to the Hart statute was hasty. 4 The Hart statute and the
Mini-Theatres ordinance are similar, though not identical.75 The Fourth
" Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (statute burdening first amend-
ment rights must further important governmental interest), with Young v. American Mini-
Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70-73 (local governments may regulate adult and non-adult establish-
ments differently because rational relation exists between the discriminatory regulations
and government's interest in preventing urban decay).
" Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 70-73.
7' In Mini-Theatres, Justice Powell upheld the Detroit ordinance's discriminatory
regulation of adult establishments on the ground that non-adult establishments do not cause
the unhealthful secondary effects that accompany adult establishments. 427 U.S. at 82
(Powell, J., concurring). The Mini-Theatres plurality upheld the Detroit ordinance against
the plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment claim on the ground that the first amendment does not
protect adult and non-adult expression equally. 427 U.S. at 70-73. In Hart Book Stores, the
Fourth Circuit adopted Justice Powell's reasoning in upholding the North Carolina statute
against the plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment challenge. 612 F.2d at 830-31.
72 Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley is distinguishable from Mini-Theatres and Hart
Book Stores. In Mosley, the Supreme Court recognized Chicago's interest in preventing
school disruption. 408 U.S. at 99-100. The Mosley Court held, however, that discriminating
against non-labor dispute picketing was not rationally related to preventing school disrup-
tion, because labor and non-labor related picketing disrupt schools equally. Id at 100. Thus,
in Mosley the critical issue was whether the discriminatory classification of pickets was ra-
tionally related to preventing school disruption. In Mini-Theatres and Hart, a rational rela-
tion existed between unequal regulation of adult and non-adult establishments and the
government's interest in preventing urban decay. Thus, under Mosley, the Hart statute and
the Mini-Theatres ordinance did not violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
guarantee. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
" Compare Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99-100, with Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 82-83 n.6, and Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten,
612 F.2d at 832.
"' See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra (discussing Fourth Circuit's holding that
Hart statute does not violate adult establishment owners' fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection rights).
" See text accompanying note 39 supra (detailing similarities between Hart statute
and Mini-Theatres ordinance).
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Circuit should have considered whether the Hart statute effectively
serves an important governmental interest,7 and whether the statute
imposes an unconstitutional burden on adult establishments' profits.
77
Had the Fourth Circuit considered these issues, the court might have
held the Hart statute a violation of adult establishment owners' first
amendment rights.
SAMUEL N. ALLEN
C. High School Students Have Limited First Amendment Rights
A school's right to suppress student expression has been the subject
of substantial litigation.' Courts generally have upheld suppression of
student expression which was likely to disrupt school operations on the
ground that the school's interest in maintaining a disciplined learning at-
mosphere outweighed student first amendment rights.2 While school
authorities may establish guidelines for prohibiting disruptive student
expression, few schools have established rules that meet first and four-
teenth amendment requirements.' The Fourth Circuit recently upheld a
school student publication rule that may serve as a model for schools
seeking to establish such rules.4
In Williams v. Spencer,5 a Montgomery County, Maryland high
school principal halted distribution of a non-school sponsored student
newspaper called the "Joint Effort."' The issue of the "Joint Effort" in
"' See text accompanying notes 54-64 supra (discussing whether Hart statute effectively
serves important governmental interest).
' See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra (discussing whether Hart statute imposes
unconstitutional economic burdens on adult establishments).
' See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (arms bands protesting Viet-Nam War); Karp v. Becker, 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973)
(picket signs); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (pro-civil rights buttons);
Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (student newspaper).
2 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 509.
See, e.g., Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) (unconstitutionally
vague prior restraint rule); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1349 (4th Cir. 1973) (un-
constitutionally vague prior restraint rule); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Education, 440 F.2d
803 (2d Cir. 1971) (prior restraint rule in violation of fourteenth amendment due process
guarantee).
Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id.
Id. at 1203. The principal only prohibited distribution of the particular "Joint Effort"
issue in question. Id. Students distributed a previous issue of the "Joint Effort" in Mont-
gomery County high school without incident. Id. at 1202. The principal did not prohibit fur-
ther distribution of past "Joint Effort" issues, or prohibit distribution of future "Joint Ef-
fort" issues. Id.
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question contained an advertisement for a store specializing in drug par-
aphernalia.' The Montgomery County high school principal informed the
"Joint Effort" student publishers that the drug paraphernalia advertise-
ment violated the Montgomery County Student Rights and Respon-
sibilities Policy's (S.R.R.P.)8 prohibition against distributing materials
encouraging unhealthful student activity on school property.'
The S.R.R.P. permits student distribution of non-school sponsored
student publications on school property provided certain procedures are
followed. 10 The S.R.R.P. does not authorize school principals to impose
prior restraints on non-school sponsored publications." The S.R.R.P.
does, however, permit school principals to discontinue the distribution of
non-school sponsored student publications if the principal decides that
the publication is obscene, libelous, will interfere with school opera-
tions, will cause lawless action, or will encourage action endangering stu-
dent health and safety.2
The S.R.R.P. contains a procedure for student appeal of a principal's
decision to halt distribution of a non-school sponsored publication. 3 If
the principal prohibits distribution of a non-school sponsored publica-
tion, he must provide the students a statement of justification within
two school days. Students may appeal adverse decisions to the area
assistant superintendent of schools within ten days of the principal's
' Id. at 1203. In addition to containing an advertisement promoting drug parapher-
nalia sales, half of the issues of the "Joint Effort" contained a marijuana cigarette rolling
paper. Id. at 1203 n.4.
' Student Rights and Responsibilities Policy of Montgomery County, Maryland
(S.R.R.P.), reprinted in Record, app. at 83, Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Appendix].
' 622 F.2d at 1203. In addition to halting distribution of the "Joint Effort" for en-
couraging unhealthful student activity, the principal halted the paper's distribution because
the publication contained a derogatory cartoon with racial overtones. Id. The cartoon in
question depicted a teacher dressed as a sheriff holding a pistol and saying "Don Smoke Dat
Evil Weed, I'll Bust Yo Ass!" Id. n.1. The principal asserted that the cartoon violated the
S.R.R.P. § IV C-2(c)2 prohibition against distributing libelous materials.
Neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the
S.R.R.P. prohibition against libelous materials. 622 F.2d at 1204 n.6. The district court
elected not to consider the constitutionality of both the S.R.R.P. prohibition against
materials encouraging unhealthful student activity and the S.R.R.P. prohibiton against
libelous material in the same opinion. Id. The Fourth Circuit did not consider the constitu-
tionality of the S.RR.P.'s prohibition against libelous material because the district court
had not yet rendered an opinion on the issue. 622 F.2d at 1204 n.6.
"0 The S.R.R.P. permits student distribution of non-school sponsored publications pro-
vided the publication bears the sponsoring individual's name, is published by Montgomery
County Public School students, and distribution procedures are authorized by school of-
ficials. S.R.R.P. § IV C-2(a) reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 98.
" See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d at 1206 (S.R.R.P. does not authorize prior
restraint of student publications).
" S.R.R.P. § IV C, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 90.
" S.R.R.P. § XIII C, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 97.
" S.R.R.P. § XIII C-2(d), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
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decision. 5 The S.R.R.P. requires that the area assistant superintendent
render his decision within ten days of the filing of the appeal." The
S.R.R.P. entitles students to request an informal hearing before the area
assistant superintendent as an alternative to filing a written appeal.'
The informal hearing must be conducted within ten school days. 8 The
area assistant superintendent is required to render his decision within
five school days of the hearing. 9 If the students receive an adverse deci-
sion from the area assistant superintendent under either appellate pro-
cedure, they may appeal to the superintendent of schools within ten
school days of receiving the decision." The S.R.R.P. requires that the
superintendent render his decision within five school days.2'
After exhausting their S.R.R.P. appeals, the "Joint Effort" student
publishers brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland.' The district court upheld the principal's actions
and the S.R.R.P. against all of the students' constitutional challenges.'
The students appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
On appeal, the students argued that the S.R.R.P. prohibition of non-
school sponsored student publications encouraging unhealthful student
activity was unconstitutionally vague " and overbroad,' and an abridge-
ment of student first amendment rights." The students also argued that
15 S.R.R.P. § XIII C-1, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 98.
:6 S.R.R.P. § XIII 0-2(c), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
7 S.R.R.P. § XIII C-1(c)(2), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 98.
11 S.R.R.P. § Xm C-2(a)(2), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
11 S.R.R.P. § XI C-3(c)(2), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
S.R.R.P. § XIII C-4(a), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
S.R.R.P. § Xm C-4(c), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
The S.R.R.P. contains no provision for appeal to the Board of Education, but the
superintendent offered the plaintiffs such a review in Williams. 622 F.2d at 1204 n.5. After
unsuccessful S.R.R.P. appeals, the plaintiffs chose to bring suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland rather than pursue an appeal to the Montgomery County
Board of Education. Id.; see text accompanying notes 24-27 infra (plaintiffs' challenges of
S.R.R.P.).
The district court ruled on the students' constitutional challenges of the S.R.R.P. in
separate opinions. See Williams v. Spencer, No. M-78-765 (D. Md. May 31, 1978) (oral opin-
ion), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 113, 133 (holding that S.R.R.P. does not violate
student first amendment rights); Williams v. Spencer, No. M-78-765 (D. Md. June 5, 1978)
(mem.), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 136 (S.R.R.P. does not violate fourteenth
amendment due process requirements).
24 622 F.2d at 1205; see Brief for Appellant at 13-17, Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200
(4th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant] (plaintiffs' vagueness challenge);
Reply Brief for Appellant at 8-10, Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Reply Brief] (plaintiffs' vagueness challenge).
See Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 13-17 (plaintiffs' assertion that the
S.R.R.P. is unconstitutionally overbroad); Reply Brief, at 8-10 (plaintiffs' assertion that
S.R.R.P. is unconstitutionally overbroad).
" Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d at 1206. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 7-9
(plaintiffs' argument that S.R.R.P. abridges student's first amendment rights); Reply Brief,
supra note 24, at 8-10 (plaintiffs' argument that S.R.R.P. abridges students' first amendment
rights).
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the S.R.R.P. appellate procedure did not meet fourteenth amendment
due process requirementsY The Fourth Circuit held that the S.R.R.P. is
not constitutionally vague,28 and is not an unconstitutional burden on stu-
dent first amendment rights.29 The Williams court also held that the
S.R.R.P. appellate procedure meets fourteenth amendment due process
requirements.2 0 The court did not address the issue of whether the
S.R.R.P. prohibition of non-school sponsored student publications en-
couraging unhealthful student activity was unconstitutionally over-
broad. 1
The Fourth Circuit applied the Baughman v. Freienmuth32 vague-
ness standard to hold that the S.R.R.P. prohibition of non-school spon-
sored student publications encouraging unhealthful student activity is
not unconstitutionally vague.2 3 In Baughman, the Fourth Circuit held
that school rules authorizing prior restraint of student publications must
define prohibited materials so that reasonably intelligent high school
students will be able to ascertain what may be published.' The Fourth
Circuit held that the S.R.R.P. meets the Baughman standard because
reasonably intelligent high school students should know that promoting
use of drug paraphernalia encourages an activity which endangers stu-
dent health and safety. 5 The Williams court held further that the
S.R.R.P. is sufficiently precise because the range of activities that en-
courage unhealthful student activity is so identifiable that listing such
activities is not required. 6
" Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d at 1207. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at
25-27 (plaintiffs' argument that S.R.R.P. appellate procedure violates fourteenth amend-
ment due process requirements).
622 F.2d 1205; see text accompanying notes 92-104 infra.
622 F.2d at 1206; see text accompanying notes 63-79 infra.
622 F.2d at 1207; see text accompanying notes 55-62 infra.
31 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d at 1205.
478 F.2d at 1351. In Baughman, the Fourth Circuit held that a school prior restraint
rule may be invalid even if the rule defines precisely which materials are prohibited. Id The
Baughman court ruled that in addition to defining the prohibited materials, a school prior
restraint rule must define "distribution." Id- The court required that school prior restraint
rules define "distribution" because school officials may prohibit distribution of some student
publications only when officials anticipate substantial distribution while officials may pro-
hibit other materials when a single copy is distributed. Id at 1349. The court cited materials
advocating disruptive activity as materials subject to suppression only where substantial
distribution is anticipated. Id. The Baughman court cited pornography as a material subject
to suppression where a single copy is distributed. Id.
Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d at 1205.
Id. The school challenged the students standing to raise constitutional challenges
against the S.R.R.P. The Williams court held that the students lacked standing to challenge
sections of the S.R.R.P. that were not relevant in halting distribution of the "Joint Effort."
622 F.2d at 1204 n.7. The Fourth Circuit held that persons must be affected by a rule to ac-
quire standing to challenge the rule. Id-
While holding that the students had standing to bring an action for damages, the
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The most important issue in Williams was whether the S.R.R.P. pro-
hibition of non-school sponsored student publications encouraging
unhealthful student activity violates student first amendment rights. 7
The "Joint Effort" student publishers argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict' established the exlcusive constitutional justification for suppress-
ing student expression2 In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that student
first amendment rights are subservient to overriding school interests. 0
The Court held that schools have an overriding interests in suppressing
student expression that is likely to cause material and substantial in-
terference with school operations.' In Williams, the students argued
that suppressing material encouraging unhealthful student activity
violates the first amendment under Tinker because such expression does
not materially and substantially disrupt school operations. 2
The Williams court held that preventing school disruption is not the
Fourth Circuit held the students' claim for injunctive relief moot on the ground that all
of the "Joint Effort" publishers had graduated from the high school. Id. The Supreme Court
decisions in Indianapolis Bd. of School Commr's v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129 (1975) and
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) hold that students who have graduated do
not have standing to bring an action for injunctive relief against school officials for interfer-
ing with student publications. Such students lack standing because the students are not in-
volved personally in a case or controversy with school officials after graduation. Indiana-
polis Bd. of School Commr's v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. at 128; DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. at 317.
An exception to the standing rule exists where the student's claim is pursuant to a
class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indianapolis Bd. of
School Commr's v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. at 128; Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1360
(7th Cir. 1972). Another exception to thb standing rule exists where graduated students and
"others similarly situated" bring an action against school officials who have interferred with
student publications. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 514 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 925 (1978). The appellants in Williams did not fall under either standing exception
because the "Joint Effort's" publishers did not institute a class action suit, nor was their
claim brought by "others similarly situated."
, Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d at 1206.
393 U.S. 503 (1969); see text accompanying note 41 infra (discussing Tinker).
Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 9-10; Reply Brief, supra note 24, at 5.
40 393 U.S. at 511.
" Id. at 512-13. Tinker is the leading Supreme Court decision on student first amend-
ment rights. In Tinker, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an unwritten
Des Moines, Iowa school policy prohibiting students from wearing black armbands in pro-
test of the Viet-Nam war. Id. at 504. The Supreme Court viewed wearing of armbands as
symbolic speech entitled to first amendment protection. Id. at 514. The Tinker Court held
that school officials are not authorized to regulate students' right to engage in symbolic
speech absent a constitutionally valid interest. Id at 511. Thus, in Tinker the Supreme
Court held that school officials may suppress student expression when evidence leads school
officials to the reasonable conclusion that the questioned expression will cause material and
substantial disruption of school operations. Id. at 509. Since Des Moines school officials had
no evidence that wearing armbands would cause material and substantial disruption of
school operations, the Supreme Court held that prohibiting students from wearing arm
bands violated students' first amendment rights. Id. at 514.
" 622 F.2d at' 1205-06; Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 18.
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exclusive overriding interest that justifies suppressing student expres-
sion." The court ruled that the school's interest in protecting students
from unhealthful activities is superior to student first amendment
rights." Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that the S.R.R.P. prohibition
against non-school sponsored student publications encouraging unhealth-
ful student activity does not violate student first amendment rights
under the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker."
The Fourth Circuit also upheld suppression of the "Joint Effort"
drug paraphernalia advertisement on the ground that the advertisement
was commercial speech.' The court held that schools may suppress
commercial speech because the first amendment does not protect com-
mercial and non-commercial speech equally." Having determined that
suppression of the "Joint Effort" drug advertisement did not violate stu-
dent first amendment rights, the Williams court addressed the students'
argument that the S.R.R.P. appellate procedure did not meet fourteenth
amendment due process requirements. 8
The Fourth Circuit held that the S.R.R.P. met fourteenth amend-
ment due process requirements because the S.R.R.P. contains an ade-
quate appellate procedure. 9 The Williams court found the S.R.R.P. ap-
pellate procedure's timetable for adjudication reasonable on its face.'
The court held that in Williams, school officials did not delay ruling on
the students' appeals, and that the "Joint Effort" administrative appeal
was not unnecessarily lengthy. 1
The soundness of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Williams depends
upon whether the S.R.R.P. adequately protects student first amendment
rights.2 While the S.R.R.P. appellate procedure may afford students ade-
quate due process protection, the S.R.R.P. may abridge student first
amendment rights if vague or overbroad. 3 Thus, the S.R.R.P. could be
, 622 F.2d at 1206.
44 Id.
a Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that upholding the S.R.R.P. against a first amend-
ment challenge was consistent with previous Fourth Circuit decisions. Id. The court noted
that Fourth Circuit decisions striking down restraints on student expression involved prior
restraint rules, while Williams involved a post publication sanction rule. Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the S.R.R.P. on the ground that post publication sanctions do not




' Id. at 1207.
50 Id
51 Id.
5 See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 509.
See text accompanying notes 55-62 infra (constitutionality of S.R.R.P. appellate pro-
cedure); text accompanying notes 92-104 infra (S.R.R.P. vagueness); text accompanying
notes 105-117 infra (S.R.R.P. overbreadth).
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unconstitutional even if the first amendment allows schools officials to
suppress publications encouraging unhealthful student activity.'
The Williams court's holding that the S.R.R.P. appellate procedure
meets fourteenth amendment due process requirements is consistent
with previous Fourth Circuit cases." In Quarterman v. Byrd,"5 the
Fourth Circuit struck down a school prior restraint rule on the ground
that the rule lacked "an expidicious review procedure."57 In Baughman v.
Freienmuth, the Fourth Circuit found that an appellate procedure did
not satisfy due process requirements for two reasons. First, the pro-
cedure did not require school officials to render decisions within
specified time limits." Second, the Baughman appellate procedure did
not specify the consequences of school officials' failure to act promptly in
ruling on student appeals. 9 In Nitzberg v. Parks," the Fourth Circuit
struck down a school prior restraint rule because the time limits provided
for appellate review were not specific, and because the procedure did
not allow aggrieved students to present arguments for allowing distribu-
tion to school officials personally."' The Williams procedure was not defi-
cient in any of these respects.2
In upholding the S.R.R.P. against the students' first amendment
challenge, the Fourth Circuit noted that school officials have authority
to suppress disruptive student expression because schools have an over-
riding interest in maintaining an orderly learning environment."3 The
suppression of publications encouraging unhealthful student activity
does not further the school's interest in maintaining disciplined
academic conditions, but protects students from exposure to the sup-
pressed publication." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's holding implies
that the school's interest in shielding students from dangerous materials
" See text accompanying notes 86-91 infra.
13 622 F.2d at 1207.
453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
, Id. at 59.
478 F.2d at 1351.
5' Id The S.R.R.P. appellate procedure does not indicate the consequences of school of-
ficials' failure to render appellate decisions within the required time limits. See text accom-
panying notes 14-22 supra (detailing S.R.R.P. timetable for appellate review of suppressed
student publications). In Williams, school officials acted within S.R.R.P. time limits. 622
F.2d at 1203-04. Under Baughman, the S.R.R.P. appellate procedure could be unconstitution-
ally vague despite the school officials' prompt action in Williams. See Baughman v. Freien-
muth, 478 F.2d at 1351 (holding that school prior restraint rule must specify consequences of
school's failure to meet rule's timetable for appellate review).
5' 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 384.
5' But see text accompanying note 59 supra (discussing S.R.R.P.'s failure to detail con-
sequences of school's failure to meet appellate procedure requirements).
13 622 F.2d at 1206; see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. at 509 (school officials authorized to suppress student expression causing material
and substantial disruption of school opeiations).
" See text accompanying notes 66-79 infra.
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outweighs students' first amendment rights because students lack the
maturity necessary to make rational judgements regarding their par-
ticipation in dangerous activities."5
The Williams court's decision that schools have an overriding in-
terest in protecting students from materials encouraging unhealthful
student activity is consistent with pertinent case law. In Ginsberg v.
New York, 8 the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute prohibiting
the sale of adult magazines to minors." The Ginsberg Court held that
New York had a legitimate interest in shielding children from printed
materials which might have an adverse effect on children's emotional
development." The Court held that children's first amendment rights
are not equal to adults' first amendment rights, because immaturity
limits a child's ability to make rational value judgements regarding the
interpretation of pornographic materials. 9
In Trachtman v. Anker, ° the Second Circuit applied Ginsberg in the
public school context." The Trachtman court held that prohibiting
students from conducting a survey on students' sexual habits did not
abridge student first amendment rights.72 The court held that the sexual
habits survey was likely to cause psychological harm to some students
due to their age and maturity, and that school officials had the authority
to protect students from harmful materials.3
The Williams court's implied holding that students lack the maturity
to make responsible judgments concerning publications that encourage
unhealthful student activity also is consistent with previous Fourth Cir-
cuit decisions. In Quarterman v. Byrd,7 the Fourth Circuit held that the
See 622 F.2d at 1206.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
67 Id. at 633.
Id. at 638 & n.6.
69 Id. Under Ginsberg, some printed materials that are not obscene in relation to
adults are obscene in relation to children. Id. at 641. Children do not have a right to pur-
chase such materials because the first amendment does not protect obscene materials. Id.;
cf. text accompanying notes 80-85 infra (discussing first amendment protection of commer-
cial speech).
" 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
", Id. at 517; see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
72 563 F.2d at 520.
7 Id. In Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972),
the Second Circuit used Ginsberg's "protection" rationale in upholding a New York statute
prohibiting the soliciting of funds from high school students on school grounds. Id. at
1059-61. The Katz plaintiffs were students who attempted to solicit contributions from other
students to help pay legal expenses for same civil rights activists on trial in Illinois. Id. The
Second Circuit held that the New York statute was a valid exercise of police power designed
to protect students from unethical solicitors. Id. at 1060.
The Katz reasoning applies in Williams. School officials have a right to protect
students from harmful expression. Id. The advocation of drug use is harmful expression.
Therefore, school officials may suppress advertisements advocating drug use.
1' 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971).
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age and maturity of persons exposed to expression are relevant factors
in determining the extent of the expression's first amendment protec-
tion.75 In Nitzberg v. Parks," and Baughman v. Freienmuth,"' the Fourth
Circuit recognized that the first amendment rights of adults and
children are not equivalent.78 Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in
Ginsberg, the Second Circuit's holding in Trachtman, and Fourth Circuit
cases considering students' first amendment rights all support the
Williams court's decision to uphold the S.R.R.P. prohibition of publica-
tions that encourage unhealthful student activity. 9
Distinguishing the first amendment rights of adults and children,
however, was not the Fourth Circuit's sole justification for upholding
the suppression of the "Joint Effort" drug paraphernalia advertisement.
The Fourth Circuit also upheld suppression of the advertisement on the
ground that the first amendment does not protect commercial and non-
"' Id at 57-59.
71 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
,' Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 382 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing Quarterman v. Byrd, 453
F.2d 54, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1971); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973).
In holding that school officials have authority to protect students from harmful ex-
pression, the Williams court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker did not re-
quire school officials to prove that the "Joint Effort" drug paraphernalia advertisement
would have caused school disruption. Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d at 1205. Nevertheless,
school officials could have demonstrated that the "Joint Effort's" drug paraphernalia adver-
tisement would have disrupted school operations. Student drug use disrupts school opera-
tions, because a student affected by perception altering substances cannot learn properly.
School officials could expect that the "Joint Effort" drug paraphernalia advertisement
would increase student drug use and, consequently, would disrupt school operations. Thus,
school officials arguably could suppress the drug paraphernalia advertisement under the
Tinker rationale without abridging students' first amendment rights. While Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) indicates that protecting children from harmful expression is
a valid interest limiting children's first amendment rights, the Williams court should have
demonstrated the "Joint Effort's" potential disruptive impact because most cases consider-
ing student first amendment rights following Tinker have focused on whether expression is
likely to disrupt school operations. See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973)
(protest of teacher's firing disrupted school operations); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460
F.2d 1355, 1357 (7th Cir. 1972) (distributing underground newspaper on school grounds did
not cause disruption of school operations); Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436
F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1971) (arm bands protesting Viet-Nam war did not disrupt school
operations); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (libelous student
newspaper likely to cause disruption of school operations).
The Fourth Circuit cases that address school prior restraint rules also have focused on
whether the publication involved would cause material and substantial disruption of school
operations. See Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) ("substantial disruption
of or material interference with" school operations not adequately defined); Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Tinker in holding that school of-
ficials may suppress student expression likely to disrupt school operations); Quarterman v.
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58-59 (4th Cir. 1971) (suppressing student expression is constitutional
when evidence indicates that questioned expression will cause material and substantial
disruption of school operations).
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commercial speech equally." The Fourth Circuit's distinction between
commercial and non-commercial speech justifies the school's suppression
of the advertisement in the "Joint Effort" because the sale of drug para-
phernalia is illegal in Maryland. 1 In Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,82 the Supreme Court held that the
first amendment does not protect commercial advertisements that pro-
mote illegal activities. 3 The Supreme Court also has held that the first
amendment accords lesser protection to commercial speech than to non-
commercial speech. 4 Therefore, in Williams, the authority of school of-
ficials to suppress commercial speech in the "Joint Effort" was not
limited to advertisements promoting illegal activity.85
In distinguishing the first amendment's protection of commercial
and non-commercial speech, the Fourth Circuit recognized that schools
might not be authorized to suppress editorials examining drug use.88
While the Fourth Circuit distinguished advertisements and editorials
pertaining to drug use, the S.R.R.P. makes no such distinctionY Under
the S.R.R.P., school officials are authorized to suppress both advertise-
ments and editorials encouraging unhealthful student activity.' Thus,
the S.R.R.P. prohibits materials which might have first amendment pro-
tection under the Fourth Circuit's decision in Williams."' Consequently, a
serious question exists regarding whether the S.R.R.P. is unconstitution-
ally overbroad." A related question exists regarding whether the
S.R.R.P. is unconstitutionally vague, since the S.R.R.P. does not define
the materials that encourage unhealthful student activity. 1
" 622 F.2d at 1206.
" MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 287A (Supp. 1980).
" 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980).
' Id at 2349-50. In Central Hudson Gas, the Supreme Court recognized a four part
test for determining when suppression of commercial speech is justified. The threshold
issue is whether the first amendment protects the speech in question. Id. at 2351. Commer-
cial speech must promote a lawful activity without being misleading to warrant first amend-
ment protection. Id. Second, the government must have a substantial interest in suppress-
ing the speech. Id. Third, suppression of the speech must effectively serve the governmen-
tal interest asserted. Id. Finally, the regulation of commercial speech must not be greater
than necessary to further the governmental interest. Id.
" Id. at 2349-50; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1975).
' While in Williams school officials had absolute authority to suppress commercial
speech promoting illegal activity, the officials' authority to suppress advertisements pro-
moting lawful activity is limited. See note 83 supra (test for determining when suppression
of commercial speech is justified).
622 F.2d at 1206-07.
' See S.R.R.P. § VI C-2, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
" See S.R.R.P. § VI C-2, reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 99.
" See 622 F.2d at 1206 (distinguishing first amendment protection of commercial
speech and articles having literary value).
" See text accompanying notes 105-117 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 92-104 infra.
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
In Williams, the Fourth Circuit upheld the S.R.R.P. prohibition of
materials encouraging unhealthful student activity over the plaintiffs'
vagueness challenge because the "Joint Effort" student publishers
should have known that drug paraphernalia use is an unhealthful activi-
ty.92 A statute may be unconstitutionally vague, however, even if the
statute clearly applies to the speech in question. 3 Thus, the question of
whether drug paraphernalia use is an unhealthful activity is not
dispositive in determining whether the S.R.R.P. is unconstitutionally
vague.'
The Williams court's decision to uphold the S.R.R.P. over the plain-
tiffs' vagueness challenge appears inconsistent with previous Fourth
Circuit cases which have considered student publication restraint rules.
In Baughman v. Freienmuth,95 the Fourth Circuit held that school of-
ficials have authority prohibit distribution of "obscene" or "libelous" stu-
dent publications. 8 The Baughman court nonetheless struck down the
school's prior restraint policy as unconstitutionally vague on the ground
that the policy did not define "obscene" or "libelous." '97 In Nitzberg v.
Parks" the Fourth Circuit considered the constitutionality of a school
prior restraint rule that prohibited distribution of materials found to
cause a "substantial disruption" of school operations." The court held
the Nitzberg prior restraint rule unconstitutionally vague on the ground
that the rule did not define "substantial disruption.""
Baughman and Nitzberg held that school prior restraint rules must
define precisely the prohibited materials so that reasonably intelligent
students can determine what may be published."' The S.R.R.P. prohibits
622 F.2d at 1207.
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619-620 (1971). In addition to holding that a
statute limiting first amendment rights is unenforceable if vague, even if the statute is not
vague as applied to the speech in question, the Supreme Court has held that a statute may
be challenged as unconstitutionally vague where the statute clearly prohibits the speech in
question. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97 (1940). In light of Coates, Thornhill, and Freedman, the Fourth Circuit could have found
the S.R.R.P. prohibition against non-school sponsored publications containing materials en-
couraging unhealthful student activity unconstitutionally vague despite the S.R.R.P.'s clear
applicability to the "Joint Effort" drug paraphernalia advertisement. See Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra note 24, at 15; text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
" See text accompanying note 93 supra.
" 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 1351.
91id.
' 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 381 n.2.
11 Id. at 383. In Nitzberg, the Fourth Circuit held that a Baltimore, Maryland school
prior restraint rule's definition of "libelous" did not meet the vagueness standard established
by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Williams, the
Fourth Circuit held that the appellants lacked standing to challenge the S.R.R.P. definition
of "libelous" for vagueness. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
I Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478
F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973).
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materials that "encourages actions which endanger the health and safety
of students."'0 2 Reasonably intelligent high school students cannot deter-
mine whether materials "encourage" "actions" that "endanger"
students' health and safety because the S.R.R.P. does not define those
terms."2 Thus, the Fourth Circuit appears to have applied less stringent
definitional requirements in Williams than the court required in
Baughman and Nitzberg.'"
The Williams court's refusal to require a stringent definition of
material that "encourages actions which endanger the health and safety
of students" also raises the issue of whether the S.R.R.P. is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad."' The S.R.R.P. is overbroad if it prohibits the
publication or distribution of materials having first amendment protec-
tion."' While many activities are easily identifiable as dangerous to stu-
dent health and safety, school officials might not have authority to sup-
press all materials encouraging such activities. 7 Additionally, while the
Williams court held that the first amendment does not protect adver-
tisements promoting drug use, the court noted that the first amendment
might protect editorials discussing drug use."' On its face, the S.R.R.P.
prohibits all materials that encourage unhealthful student activity.'
Therefore, the S.R.R.P. is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits
protected materials, or it authorizes school officials to suppress an
unreasonably wide range of materials encouraging unhealthful student
activity."'
"' See S.R.R.P. § IV C-2 (2)(5), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 90 (prohibiting
materials encouraging unhealthful student activity).
See S.R.R.P. § IV C-2 (2)(5), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 90.
"' See text accompanying notes 95-100 supra (Baughman-Nitzberg vagueness stan-
dard).
" See Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 13-17 (plaintiffs' argument that S.R.R.P. is
unconstitutionally overbroad); Reply Brief, supra note 24, at 8-10 (plaintiffs' argument that
S.R.R.P. is unconstitutionally overbroad).
1o8 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 219 (1975). In Erznoznik, the
Supreme Court struck down a Jacksonville city ordinance prohibiting drive-in theatres
from exhibiting movies containing material showing male or female bare buttocks, female
breasts, or human pubic areas. Id. The Erznoznik Court held the Jacksonville ordinance
overbroad. Id. Under the Jacksonville ordinance, exhibiting films showing a baby's but-
tocks, the nude body of a war casualty, or documentaries on tribes whose customary dress
revealed bare breasts would be illegal. Id The Supreme court held that such overbroad re-
strictions on free speech are not constitutionally justifiable. Id
The S.R.R.P. prohibition against materials encouraaging unhealthful student activity
upheld by the Fourth Circuit in Williams also appears overbroad. Eating junk food
arguably is an unhealthy activity. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 24, at 13. School of-
ficials hardly seem justified to prohibit junk food advertisements. Precise definitions of
which material the S.R.R.P. prohibits would not only eliminate S.R.R.P. vagueness, but also
would narrow the S.R.R.P.'s scope to constitutional limits.
10 See text accompanying notes 115-17 infra.
622 F.2d at 1206.
' See S.R.R.P. § IV C-2(2)(5), reprinted'in Appendix, supra note 8, at 90.
110 See text accompanying notes 106 supra & 111-17 infra.
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
The Supreme Court's decision in Ginsberg might justify the suppres-
sion of editorials discussing drug use from minors."' In Ginsberg, the
Court upheld the suppression of pornographic materials from minors
because children lack the maturity to form reasonable judgments re-
garding such materials. 2 Under Ginsberg's rationale, children are
unable to form reasonable judgments concerning editorials discussing
pornography."' Similarly, children lack the maturity to form reasonable
judgments regarding editorials discussing drug use."' Therefore, the
S.R.R.P. prohibition of drug paraphernalia editorials does not in itself
render the S.R.R.P. unconstitutionally overbroad.
Although Ginsberg authorized the suppression of materials likely to
harm children, Ginsberg's only clear implication was that children's first
amendment rights are inferior to adults' first amendment rights when
materials likely to corrupt children's morals are involved."' Since the
S.R.R.P. prohibits all materials that encourage unhealthful activity, the
S.R.R.P. on its face prohibits advertisements and editorials encour-
aging activities such as skydiving and eating junk food." ' While stu-
dent immaturity justifies a school's authority to shield students from
some printed materials, the first amendment protects students from
restraints upon free expression as broad as those imposed under the
S.R.R.P .117
Although the S.R.R.P. may be unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad, the Fourth Circuit had precedent to uphold the suppression of the
"Joint Effort." In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, the Supreme Court held that school officials could suppress ex-
pression likely to disrupt school operations, even though Des Moines had
not established a school rule authorizing restraints on student expres-
sion."' Under Tinker, courts have held that school officials have author-
ity to suppress student publications absent a written policy authorizing
the suppression."' Williams indicates that school officials can suppress




' Id. at 641.
S.R.R.P. § IV C-2(2)(5), reprinted in Appendix, supra note 8, at 90; Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra note 24, at 13.
'" See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 511 (ab-
sent valid overriding interest, student speech has full first amendment protection). But see
text accompanying note 84 supra (first amendment does not protect commercial and non-
commercial speech equally).
.. 393 U.S. at 509.
"' Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). In Frasca, the Eastern
District of New York upheld suppression of a student newspaper containing libelous
material despite the lack of established guidelines authorizing restraints on student publica-
tions. Id. at 1046. The court held that school officials have authority to suppress student
publications absent a written school policy authorizing the suppression when the questioned
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